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David against Goliath and other stories of how Denmark disciplined the US and outsmarted the USSR during the early years of the cold war
Denmark was during the cold war a member of OEEC (1948), NATO (1949) and CoCom (1950). Membership of OEEC was uncontroversial, of NATO at times contested and of CoCom kept as a secret. During the 1950’s opinion polls regarding membership of NATO consistently showed that a little less than 50% of the population was in favour of Danish membership of NATO. Around 25% were just as consistently against membership, and a little more than 25% had no opinion. If and when more than 50% of the population indicated that they were pro-NATO, as they did for a short period right after the outbreak of the Korean war and again after the Warsaw-pact invasion in Hungary 1956, it was because people had changed from ‘no opinion’ to  being in favour of Danish membership of NATO.​[1]​ Members of the Danish communist party (DKP) were of course against Danish membership of NATO. Apart from DKP a relatively large share of the Social-Democratic (SD) voters and most of the electorate of Radikale Venstre (RV) – a social-liberal party with a traditional affiliation to anti-war movements – were against or at least only reluctantly supported Danish membership of NATO.  Opinion polls show that a large minority (30 – 40%) of the population in 1948 favoured non-alignment and in general were critical towards the building of Western and Eastern blocs. 
Widespread scepticism against NATO membership should not be misinterpreted as sympathy for the Soviet Union or the communist system. Opinion polls show that 95 – 97% of Danish voters, when asked to choose between allegiance to West or East (not specifically a military alliance, but in general), opted for West.​[2]​ Not even members of DKP did automatically opt for East. But until 1956 the Danish Social Democrats were very sensitive and engaged in some tough fights for hearts and souls whenever DKP raised issues related to NATO membership, and especially if and when it was coupled to the issue of possible loss of work-places and economic welfare. DKP consistently claimed that Denmark since 1948 had fallen victim to American “dollar-imperialism” and risked losing its independence (in DKP’s rhetoric NATO represented a new occupation force, ready to take over where the German Nazi-regime had left). DKP claimed that the state budget was being squandered on defence, instead of being invested in public welfare. This rhetoric had some resonance in public debates about membership of NATO. 
When membership of CoCom/NATO (in news reports NATO sometimes substituted CoCom, the existence of CoCom was as already mentioned kept as a secret) in June 1952 suddenly became coupled with news of an embargo on export of Danish build ships to the Soviet Union that put employment at Danish shipyards at stake, DKP sensed the dawn of better things. This proved what they had been campaigning for some time. The real decisions regarding NATO was not the making of the Danish government, they were mere messenger boys for the Americans, and now the Americans would even forbid Danish shipyards to sell ships to the Soviet Union, loosing both much needed export orders and blue-collar jobs.
I will present two cases today, both related to the sale of tankers to the USSR in the 1950’s. Sale of tankers to the Eastern bloc was embargoed by CoCom. In spite of that a tanker was delivered to the USSR in 1952.​[3]​ This occasioned hectic diplomatic activity and a meeting between the Danish and the American ministers of foreign affairs (in London). The Danish-American crisis was eventually solved, but the Danish communist party took advantage of the situation, called for a “people’s front against NATO” and tried to raise anti-NATO sentiments especially among the Social Democratic electorate.
The Social Democratic party (in opposition from 1950-53) used positions in the trade unions as well as the press to counter the communist campaign in 1952 in full understanding with the liberal-conservative government. The former Social Democratic Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft happened to be touring the US when the tanker episode broke as a news story in Denmark in the beginning of July 1952. Case 1 below will focus on the reporting of Hans Hedtoft’s USA visit in Danish newspapers, especially the Social Democratic Press (‘Social-Demokraten’).
Case 2 will focus on the negotiation of a new Danish-Soviet trade agreement in March 1956. The Soviets (with Premier Khrushchev as chief negotiator) demanded delivery of tankers as a prerequisite for signing a trade agreement. Since the contested delivery of tankers back in 1952 Denmark had adhered to CoCom’s embargo rules. The Danish no to delivery of more tankers had caused a breakdown of Danish-Soviet trade negotiations in 1954. When negotiations were resumed in 1956 tankers were still on the negotiating table.  The Danish Social Democratic Prime Minister H.C. Hansen eventually stroked a compromise with Khrushchev. The final text stated that Denmark consented to deliver tankers to the Soviet Union, but in case this proved to be impossible freighters would be delivered instead. The story was told in Danish newspapers as a story of how the Danish Prime Minster had outsmarted Khrushchev. The rest of the CoCom member countries were, however, very critical (tankers were a strict no-go, whereas freighters were in a kind of grey zone). Archival records in the Danish Foreign Office tell the story of how the Danish government was very aware of how the story was presented, especially in the British and American press, as well as being aware of public relations strategies at home.

Hans Hedtoft in USA 1952
American protests against Danish delivery of tankers to the Soviet Union were reported with different degrees off alarm in Danish newspapers July 4th 1952. “Delivery of Danish tankers to the Soviet Union causes worry” (conservative newspaper), or “the USA wants to sanction Denmark“(communist newspaper). It is true that the American government, in accordance with the so-called ‘Battle act’, had sent an official warning to the Danish government stating that if Denmark delivered tankers to the Soviet Union, the USA would immediately cancel all economic help to Denmark. 
The crisis was almost solved when the story broke in the Danish press July the 4th. That diplomats and politicians in Denmark and the US at that time had worked for several months already to defuse an eventual crisis was never told in Danish newspapers. The press debate in Danish newspapers in July 1952 revolved around the Danish-US relationship in general and especially the case of delivery of tankers as an example of how Denmark, contrary to the national interest, was forced to compel to American cold war strategies. Hans Hedtoft held a much reported speech in San Francisco July 12th. In the speech Hedtoft thanked the US and called the Marshall-plan “one of the best examples of great statesmanship in world history”. He also stated that it was a precondition for the recovery of Danish economy that international trade flourished. The USA might contribute to a faster recovery of the Danish economy by looking at American trade policy and tariffs which were not always in full accordance with the principles of free trade. Truman did fully consent, according to Danish newspapers July the 14th; the front-cover story of Social-Demokraten was that “Truman demands a radical change of American trade and tariffs policies”. The newspaper quoted Truman for stating that “We have not considered the consequences of the embargo on trade with the countries behind the iron curtain imposed on the countries in the free world”. Truman had therefore ordered the congressional committee working with trade policy to reconsider American tariffs and other restrictions on import to the US, especially import of agricultural products, and also reconsider regulations regarding East-West trade. It was likewise reported that more American senators agreed with Hans Hedtoft. 
The reporting of crisis in Danish-American relations took a 180 degree turn from a story about how the USA tried to discipline Denmark (July 4 – 7) to a story about how Denmark disciplined the USA (July 12 – 14). It was quite a coup to stage Hans Hedtoft as President Truman’s equal, discussing trade policies  on a principled level with Truman in public, whereas the real negotiations took place somewhere else, involving the respective embassies and ministries and ministers of foreign affairs. The story ended as a news story in Danish media July 19 when President Truman officially decided to continue the American economic and military assistance to Denmark. This was taken as a proof that the Americans had listened to the sensible Danes and their arguments.

H.C. Hansen and the Danish-Soviet trade negotiations in 1956 
The Danish-Soviet trade negotiations in Moscow March 1956 was handled with great care and personally supervised by the permanent secretary of the ministry Nils Svenningsen, a very experienced top-diplomat with a long career as trouble-shooter in the Danish ministry of Foreign Affairs. This testifies to the importance attached to these negotiations. The press was handled with the same degree of care, both the Danish and the international press.
In 1954 a new trade agreement were on the negotiating table for months, but the signing was wrecked by a Soviet demand on Denmark to include tankers on the list of items to be exported to the Soviet Union. As this would have violated CoCom regulations the Danish government reluctantly had to recline from signing any agreement. Besides the commercial interests, Denmark within CoCom always argued pro enhancement of East-West trade as a means to dampen cold war tensions and also that in case of war it would be to the advantage of the West if and when the Soviet Union was dependant on import from the West, whereas a trade embargo only would lead to autarchy and in the end would not serve to weaken the Soviet Union.
The issue of ban on sale of tankers was shortly used again in 1954 by the Communist party, but this time also Danish agricultural organization to raise criticism against “foreign” (USA/NATO) intervention in Danish international trade relations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs H.C. Hansen first summoned “the democratic parties”, and a little later the agricultural organizations. During these briefings H.C. Hansen basically told the agricultural organisations and their proponents in the Danish parliament to shut up, if they ever wanted to get down to a new round of trade negotiations. Their criticism only served to encourage Moscow, whose tactic was to use the shipwrecked trade negotiations to campaign against Danish allegiance to the Western alliance. As long as this seemed a successful strategy, Moscow would uphold its demand for delivery of tankers, and Denmark would not be able to sign a new trade agreement with the Soviet Union. The agricultural organisations more or less immediately stopped campaigning for trade negotiations to be resumed. 
The trade negotiations were eventually resumed in March 1956. Prime Minister H.C. Hansen had been invited to an official visit in Moscow (following in the wake of a visit by the Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen). In order not to cause any publicity or commotion Prime Minister H.C. Hansen did not mention that trade negotiations were on the agenda for his Moscow visit.  A relatively long list op editors and journalists from all leading newspapers were invited to accompany the Prime Minster on his trip to Moscow, as this was the first official visit ever to the Soviet Union by a Danish Prime minister. It was, however, agreed that only the editor of Social-Demokraten, Peder Tabor, a trusted friend of the Prime Minister, would have access to the Prime Minister during the negotiations. Peder Tabor would then brief the rest of the press.  Nothing related to trade negotiations was therefore mentioned in the Danish press before March 7 (negotiations had started March 3). At an evening press conference March 6 Prime Minister H.C. Hansen told the Danish press that the two governments had reached an agreement regarding Danish export of tankers to the Soviet Union. The Danish government had consented to deliver tankers to the Soviet Union, if that, by the Prime Ministers return to Denmark, for one reason or the other showed to be impossible, Denmark would deliver freighters instead of tankers. All persons involved, including Premier Khrushchev, of course new that as soon as H.C. Hansen was back in Copenhagen tankers would be converted into freighters.​[4]​ 
The new Danish-Soviet accord was celebrated at a reception in the Danish embassy in Moscow on the evening of March 6 and March the 7 at a reception in the Kremlin. The receptions caused a number of toast speeches. One of the most cited remarks was Premier Khrushchev’s “’I think you have pulled our legs. Worries will keep me sleepless the next week’ joked Premier Khrushchev”. 
The negotiations March 3 – 6 were described in the Danish press as a tough fight where H.C. Hansen had staked his ground and never bowed to pressure from the leaders in the Kremlin (that is H.C. Hansen had only pro forma consented to deliver tankers).  In reports from the receptions afterwards both he and Khrushchev are described as two team-leaders, who after the match is over, jokingly go celebrating together. The way the story of how H.C. Hansen had outsmarted Khrushchev was told in the Danish press made it into a true David and Goliath story. In fact H.C. Hansen of course did not outsmart Khrushchev, Khrushchev was fully aware that he would get freighters instead of tankers, to use delivery of tankers to cause political trouble in Danish politics were no longer on the Soviet agenda.​[5]​
It was important to tell the story of the Danish-Soviet trade negotiations in March 1956 as being really tough negotiations where Denmark had stood firm. Denmark had to seek consent from CoCom for export of freighters, and CoCom only consented because they faced a fait accompli; CoCom was in fact very displeased with the signed agreement (it seems, however, that the Americans had nodded on beforehand). In order to explain why Denmark had skipped the process with prior consultations in CoCom it was most convenient to tell a story of how Khrushchev had surprised the Danish delegation by putting trade on the agenda and how the Danish government nonetheless had not bowed to pressure. 
Both examples show deliberate use of Danish media to get a story through which is not totally wrong, but on the other hand definitely not totally true either. The interesting question is what these edited versions of actual cold war events may tell us about a government’s relation with its public at home?
The press stories were obviously framed to fit in with popular opinion, championing relative independence of bloc-politics and what was seen as exaggerated American anti-communism, the latter in line with the general picture of USA presented in Danish media around 1952 that may be termed a friendly, critical attitude.
The two cases show an interesting relationship between the real events and the newspaper stories. In the first case Hans Hedtoft claimed to have disciplined the US as a means to avert hard criticism of Danish membership of NATO/CoCom. In the second case H.C. Hansen claimed to have outsmarted the Soviet Union and to have pursued national, Danish political goals. Both stories, in 1956 including the whole running up to the actual negotiations, were designed to avert criticism in the Danish public of CoCom and NATO membership.  The ambivalence inherent between championing the ability to act independent in the cold war’s superpower games, and at the same time utilize stories of how Denmark took an independent stand to create support for membership of the Western alliance, is characteristic of Danish media’s news reporting about cold war events with Denmark involved during the early cold war.
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^1	  Ugens Gallup [the Weekly Gallup], April 12, 1957 (“Stigende tilslutning til NATO” [an increase in Danish support for membership of NATO] shows the results of opinion polls regarding Danish membership of NATO March 1949 – February 1956. http://www.gallup.dk/nyhedscenter/meningsmaalinger.aspx
^2	  Ugens Gallup [the Weekly Gallup], March 13 and June 23, 1948 (“Skal Danmark tage stilling til Vest eller Øst?” [should Denmark opt for West or East?]). Even among DKP’s electorate around 35% stated they favoured allegiance to the West.
^3	  The ship had been contracted already in 1948 before CoCom was founded, and the Danish government argued that a contract was a contract and had to be observed. The US government in the end accepted the argument. If and when President Truman had interrupted American economic assistance to Denmark which the American Battle-Act in fact decreed, Danish membership of NATO had been at stake. The Danish and American governments were agreed that it was in the best interest of both Denmark and the US not to run that risk and consequently a solution to the problem had to be found. For a detailed analysis of the “Tanker-crisis” in 1952 see Rostgaard, ”Østhandel og Opinionsdannelse” [Eastern Trade and Formation of Public Opinion], in: Boje, Rostgaard and Rüdiger, Handelspolitikken som kampplads under den kolde krig [Trade policy as a battle field during the cold war], Aalborg University Press, 2011 (in print).
^4	  For a detailed account of the 1956-trade negotiations see Rostgaard and Rüdiger, H.C. Hansen og handelsforhandlingerne i Moskva 1956 [The Danish- Soviet trade negotiations in Moscow 1956 and the posthumous reputation of Prime minister H.C. Hansen] , Temp, årg. [vol] 2, nummer [number ] 3, 2011 (in print).
^5	  Cf. Nigel Gould-Davies, The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy, Diplomatic History, Vol. 27,2, 2003
